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What is corporate social responsibility?
There are definitions of corporate responsibility and then 
there are positions. The positions range from enthusiastic 
advocates for to zealous critics of. In this evolving arena, 
all positions have points worth considering. Ultimately, CSR 
is an ideal. CSR represents “…a type of longer-term prag-
matic and visionary thinking”, but it could also become “a 
diversion from the real issues of law reform and multilevel 
political and social development” (Kemp, 2001). 
An evolving concept
Theory and practice within the field of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) continues to evolve. In the 1970s and 
1980s, it focused on philanthropy (Cochran, 2007), business 
ethics, and corporate citizenship, developing into the triple 
bottom line concept more commonly known today (Nehme 
and Wee, 2008; Robins, 2005). The triple bottom line 
approach identifies three Ps: profit, people, and planet, and 
advocates that businesses measure their impacts on society 
and the environment (The Economist, 2009). The 2000s 
saw renewed interest in sustainable development in the 
private sector and a shift in terminology from CSR to cor-
porate sustainability that built on the foundation of CSR, 
but added an increased emphasis on governance and long-
term strategic planning (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). 
Although there are multiple components to CSR (e.g. human 
resources, external relations, marketing, risk management, 
financing, and ethical and legal obligations), the business 
case can be boiled down to a company’s need to generate 
profit and ensure access to financing and capital. CSR con-
tributes to those needs through the promotion of good corporate 
governance and risk management (LRQA and CSR Asia, 
2010). In developed countries, firms with solid CSR prac-
tices are better able to attract and retain employees, maintain 
good relationships with the government (which can help 
the firm to influence public policy or new regulations) and 
are viewed as more transparent and trustworthy by the 
public (Cochran, 2007). Good CSR policies and practices, 
according to its advocates, give companies a competitive 
advantage, helps them better manage their social and envi-
ronmental risks, helps maintain access to financing from 
socially responsible investors and banks (Carroll and Sha-
bana, 2010; Nehme and Wee, 2008), and gives them 
greater legitimacy through a ‘social license’ to operate 
(LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010). Critics argue that CSR is too 
often just public relations ‘spin’ or ‘greenwashing’ and 
actually undermines workers’ rights.
Definition 
The Commission of the European Communities provides a 
commonly cited definition of CSR as “a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interactions with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis,” (Dahlsrud, 2008). This 
definition contrasts with the traditional view that the only 
responsibility a business has is to maximize owner or share-
holder profits (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). 
Conclusion: CSR has come a long way from its philan-
thropic origins to its current incarnation as corporate 
sustainability. Environmental, social, and governance 
components are now firmly embedded in CSR, and efforts 
are made by companies to measure, monitor, and report on 
their CSR activities. There is a large body of literature on 
the business case for CSR. 
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What are the main international CSR frameworks 
and initiatives? 
Recognition of the business case for CSR has led to the 
development of international frameworks setting out guid-
ing principles, with the aim of standardizing CSR practices 
and reporting for both businesses and financiers. Two ques-
tions to keep in mind when assessing frameworks are:
• Who developed the framework and why? 
• Are these frameworks considered authoritative or 
   legitimate and by whom? 
One of the first major frameworks to emerge was the UN 
Global Compact in 2000 (UN Global Compact, 2011). The 
Compact was seen as having considerable success in extend-
ing across sectors and across both Northern and Southern 
companies. In the same year, the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) released its first edition of the Sustainability Report-
ing Framework and Guidelines, which included indicators 
for the measurement and reporting of the economic, envi-
ronmental, social, and governance aspects of a business 
operation (GRI, n.d.). The UN Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights were developed by John Ruggie, 
who set up the UN Global Compact, and were developed 
with extensive consultations across a wide range of corpo-
rate, civil society, and government stakeholders. The frame-
work outlines the responsibilities of companies with respect 
to human rights (and how to do this). It has been supported 
by Chinese, Indian, US, European and other governments. 
Many of the world’s leading corporations have also expressed 
support for the framework. 
In 2003, banks engaged in project finance established the 
Equator Principles in collaboration with the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). The Equator Principles are a 
set of ten principles that comprise a credit risk framework, 
and set a minimum standard for due diligence when assess-
ing and managing social and environmental risks for projects 
with capital costs of more than US$10 million. The Equator 
Principles were based on the World Bank’s Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Guidelines, and IFC’s Performance 
Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability. 
Originally, the Equator Principles applied only to project 
finance transactions, but they are now being applied by some 
Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) to a 
wider range of transactions. In addition to European and 
US banks, there are also several banks from Brazil, one 
from South Africa, and one from China. Significantly, 75 
financial institutions that account for 70% of the project 
finance debt in emerging economies are adopters of the 
Equator Principles (Equator Principles Association, 2011).
The IFC’s Performance Standards were introduced in 2006 
and updated in 2012, and they apply to projects funded by 
EPFIs (Matsumoto, 2009). There are eight standards, cov-
ering environmental and social impact assessment and 
management, labor, pollution, community health, resettle-
ment, biodiversity conservation, indigenous peoples, and 
culture (IFC, 2012). The IFC standards have become a 
leading corporate benchmark for environmental and social 
risk management. Numerous companies voluntarily commit 
to follow the standard even if they are not seeking IFC fi-
nancing. Most OECD export credit agencies also follow the 
IFC standards, as do some other development banks. They 
are considered highly influential in the corporate sustain-
ability world. 
Most EPFIs are multinational banks from North American 
or European countries (Foran et al, 2010). As only four 
Asian banks have adopted the Equator Principles, EPFIs do 
not have a significant presence in the Asian project finance 
market (Le Clerc, 2012). Although most major Thai banks 
have CSR policies in place (Foran et al, 2010), none have 
yet adopted the Equator Principles (Le Clerc, 2012; IFC, 
n.d.). In Laos, eight banks involved in funding the Nam 
Theun 2 dam, and three financiers of the Theun-Hinboun 
Expansion Project, are EPFIs.
While the UN Global Compact and GRI were getting off 
the ground, an ambitious multi-stakeholder process known 
as the World Commission on Dams (WCD) was underway. 
The WCD studied the benefits and impacts of large dams 
and released a decision-making framework for large dam 
projects in 2000. The framework laid out seven strategic 
priorities and 26 guidelines for good practice. The WCD’s 
framework is still seen by many as the most comprehensive 
and useful to decision-makers engaged in dam projects 
(Foran, 2010). 
The International Hydropower Association’s (IHA) Sustain-
ability Guidelines followed the WCD framework in 2004. 
In 2006, the IHA released its first HSAP (IHA, 2012). One 
year later, IHA partnered with the World Wildlife Fund and 
the Nature Conservancy to create the Hydropower Sustain-
ability Assessment Forum, for the purpose of updating the 
HSAP (Foran, 2010). In 2010, a new version of the HSAP 
was released, including five sections, four of which corre-
spond to the different stages of the dam development project 
cycle. Each section contains four categories: environmental, 
social, technical, and economic/financial. Each topic is 
evaluated by the degree to which six different assessment 
criteria are met, including: assessment, management, stake-
holder engagement, stakeholder support, conformity/com-
pliance, and outcomes (IHA, 2010). While adopting many 
of the same principles as the WCD framework, the HSAP 
takes a more technocratic approach and is geared towards 
the time-frame preferences of developers, financiers, and 
operators through lower requirements for community in-
volvement and public participation (Foran, 2010). 
It should be noted that HSAP is not the culmination of years 
of CSR work nor is it a perfect standard. HSAP remains 
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new and relatively untested and is certain to hit some road-
blocks, just as other CSR standards have. It is also important 
not to exaggerate HSAP’s importance or legitimacy at this 
time. The HSAP was developed by the industry itself, 
whereas the WCD commission comprised independent 
members. In the HSAP, companies give themselves scores, 
rather than committing to follow clearly articulated standards. 
Civil society organizations in the Mekong Region remain 
highly skeptical. There are few links between HSAP and 
WCD and some argue that the HSAP undermines WCD’s 
recommendations by creating an alternative. 1  
Conclusion: International frameworks promoting CSR are 
quite new, and have only been in existence since 2000 or 
later. The Equator Principles have not been widely adopted 
in Asia like they have in Europe and North America. With 
most project financing of Mekong hydropower now coming 
from Asian banks, the Equator Principles and IFC Perfor-
mance Standards may not be as relevant as before, when 
more European and North American banks were involved. 
HSAP has some potential as a standard for the hydro-
power industry but much work remains to be done before 
it is seen as an acceptable standard outside the industry.
Criticisms of CSR-related frameworks and 
reporting
A major concern is whether or not signatories or adopters 
of a framework actually act any differently, or if adopting 
a framework is merely an exercise in public relations (not 
all frameworks require adopters to be signatories). Scholtens 
and Dam (2007), however, did find that the environmental, 
social, and governance policies of EPFIs were significantly 
different from those of non-adopters, and that large, high-
visibility banks were more likely to adopt the principles 
than smaller banks. Banks that operated in environments 
with strong civil society, regulation, and advocacy groups 
were more likely to face reputational harm from funding 
controversial projects. These banks adopted the Equator 
Principles to minimize the risk to their reputation and to 
demonstrate their responsible practices (Scholtens and Dam, 
2007). 
There is also uncertainty around the enforcement of frame-
works such as the Equator Principles and IFC Performance 
Standards. If a project fails to meet principles or performance 
standards during the course of its construction or operation 
after loans have been disbursed it is unclear whether finan-
cial institutions will take any action to force compliance 
(Transparency International, 2008; Foran et al., 2010; 
Lawrence, 2009). There is no guidance on how EPFIs are 
to implement the Equator Principles, nor is there independ-
ent verification of their implementation, and this leads to 
their inconsistent application across banks (Le Clerc, 2012).
Both the Equator Principles and the GRI have been criticized 
for not requiring project-level reporting. Reports tend to be 
on the bank’s or the company’s operations as a whole, leav-
ing out details on individual projects (Foran et al., 2010; 
Fonseca, 2010). Such reporting leaves ambiguity around 
whether or not social and environmental standards are being 
met at the project site, and what the real impacts are on the 
ground (Fonseca, 2010). In the absence of formal structured 
frameworks, ‘reporting’ tends to be left to corporate com-
munications departments who may have little actual knowl-
edge of conditions on the ground.
The WCD framework faced disapproval over what some 
critics claim is a human rights-centered approach. The WCD 
called for community participation, free, prior, and informed 
consent (FPIC), and public acceptance. The World Bank, 
IHA, and export-credit agencies all agreed with the seven 
strategic priorities, but disagreed with certain guidelines, 
particularly the ones with regard to public participation and 
human rights. They felt that these guidelines would hamper 
the development of large dams, slow down decision-making, 
and give too much power to small communities and mi-
norities (Foran, 2010; Baghel and Nüsser, 2010). 
Conclusion: Equator Principles Financial Institutions have 
better CSR policies and practices in place than non-adop-
ters, but their implementation of the Equator Principles is 
inconsistent and there is little or no project-level reporting. 
The Global Reporting Initiative increases transparency by 
bringing CSR practices to light, and subjecting reports to 
independent auditing. Project-level reporting is not, how-
ever, mandated under the GRI either. The WCD framework 
is comprehensive and widely accepted, but now faces a 
‘competitor’ in the form of the industry developed HSAP. 
What does CSR in Asia look like at present? 
Whilst the landscape is still evolving, CSR in Asia has been 
largely focused on philanthropy and community develop-
ment (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010; Krechowicz and Fer-
nando, 2009a; Krechowicz and Fernando, 2009b). This is, 
in the eyes of some, an outdated interpretation of CSR and 
provides little useful information to investors on the firm’s 
environmental and governance activities (Krechowicz and 
Fernando, 2009a). How CSR operates tends to reflect the 
history, norms and conventions of the nation in which it 
operates: it is not a homogenous entity or style (Chapple 
and Moon, 2005; Kemp, 2001). Welford 2   makes the point 
that the drivers of CSR are politics and business, not com-
munities or civil society, most of whom are still skeptical 
and see CSR as a top-down process. 
Lack of corporate transparency has been a significant ob-
stacle to better CSR programs and reporting (LRQA and 
CSR Asia, 2010; Krechowicz and Fernando, 2009b). Here 
too, change is afoot as stock markets become more aware 
of, and actively involved in, CSR reporting. Still, only 21% 
of the GRI reports in 2009 were from Asian companies 
(LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010). The hydropower sector in the 
1 - More information on perceived problems with HSAP can be found here:
     http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/voluntary-approach-will-not-resolve-dam-conflicts-4286
2 - http://www.eco-business.com/news/csr-asia-gaining-traction/ 
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Mekong is particularly lacking in transparency, a situation 
driven by corruption (Foran et al., 2010) and fears that 
openness and reporting will provoke criticism (LRQA and 
CSR Asia, 2010; Tobias, 2010). 3 
Participation in international CSR initiatives among Asian 
companies is low. In 2010, Asian companies comprised only 
3.5% of the firms listed on the Dow Jones Sustainability 
World Index, 17% of the Global Compact signatories, and 
30% of the companies delisted from the Global Compact. 
Instead, national governments and stock exchanges are 
creating locally adapted regulations to drive greater CSR 
uptake (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010). Socially responsible 
investment funds are popping up (Krechowicz and Fer-
nando, 2009a), and 2009 saw the launch of the Asian Sus-
tainability Rating that ranks companies according to their 
performance on environmental, social, and governance 
criteria (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010). Organizations such 
as the Association for Sustainable and Responsible Invest-
ment in Asia, and Responsible Research, have also been 
established to provide environmental, social, and governance 
information to investors (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010). 
Family-controlled companies and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), or those recently privatized, are common in Asia. 
The dominance of a company by a single shareholder or 
group decreases the incentive to engage in CSR, or to be 
transparent (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010; Krechowicz and 
Fernando, 2009b), as CSR is driven by shareholder and 
financier concern over corporate risk management.  Poten-
tially powerful influences on CSR adoption or operation are 
the capacity for public participation in operations, protection 
of whistle blowers, and a free investigative media.
The exception to the generally poor CSR performance of 
Asian companies is that of the extractive industries. Large, 
multinational firms that directly affect communities through 
their use of land and water are facing increased societal 
pressure to manage the harm done. These companies have 
above average reporting, and recognize that their relation-
ships with local communities and their reputation are de-
pendent upon the maintenance of their social license to 
operate (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010; Krechowicz and 
Fernando, 2009b). 
Conclusion: CSR is evolving and the number of Asian com-
panies taking CSR seriously has increased in recent years: 
new trends are emerging. Improvements are needed in trans-
parency and CSR reporting, partly due to the structure of 
many Asian companies and the style of governance. Asian 
companies have been reluctant to participate in interna-
tional initiatives, preferring locally adapted CSR standards. 
Despite the low adoption rate of CSR across the region, so-
cially responsible investment is gaining in popularity and 
natural resource-intensive companies face increased social 
pressure to manage their environmental and social impacts. 
What is the extent of CSR in Mekong hydropower 
development?
All the emerging economies in the region, except for Viet-
nam, have introduced regulations, codes, market initiatives, 
or awards to encourage CSR reporting (LRQA and CSR 
Asia, 2010; Krechowicz and Fernando, 2009a). CSR report-
ing in Malaysia and Thailand focuses on community devel-
opment and philanthropy, while Vietnamese companies 
engage in limited reporting (Krechowicz and Fernando, 
2009a). 
China released guidelines on CSR reporting, which SOEs 
are encouraged to follow, and the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges require listed companies to report on their 
CSR practices. Likewise, Bursa Malaysia established its 
own CSR framework and reporting requirements for listed 
companies (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010). Companies have 
the flexibility to decide what and how much to report, and 
the use of standard metrics is lacking. Thailand’s stock 
exchange does not have any requirements for CSR reporting 
and companies listed on Vietnam’s relatively new stock 
exchange mostly only report in Vietnamese (Krechowicz 
and Fernando, 2009b). At the same time, some state-owned 
enterprises are figuring out how to get around CSR. Sev-
eral have created a publicly traded subsidiary that is quite 
CSR conscious, while their main operations maintain the 
old way of doing business.
Conclusion: Stock exchanges in the region are making ef-
forts towards CSR reporting as are companies intending to 
list on international exchanges, where public accountabil-
ity ranks high. China’s stock exchanges have the most 
stringent reporting requirements, followed by Bursa Ma-
laysia. CSR reporting on Thailand’s stock exchange is not 
mandatory, and voluntary reporting focuses on community 
development and philanthropy. Vietnam has the weakest 
reporting, with no regulations and few companies that report. 
Do Mekong hydropower developers engage in CSR?
There is little literature on the nature or extent of CSR in 
Mekong hydropower development. Three papers, by Foran 
et al. (2010), Middleton et al. (2009), and International 
Rivers (2008) provide information on investors and devel-
opers in Mekong hydropower indicating low overall engage-
ment with CSR. Thai banks and developers make up the 
bulk of the investors mentioned in the three papers. Four 
Thai banks have CSR policies (Export-Import Bank of 
Thailand, 2011; Siam Commercial Bank, n.d.; Bank of 
Ayudhya, n.d.; Kasikorn Bank, 2011). All but Siam Com-
mercial Bank have sections on CSR focusing on philan-
thropy, community development, and employee voluntarism 
in their annual reports. Of the four, only Kasikorn Bank 
attempts to line up its CSR reporting indicators with GRI 
metrics. 
3 -http://www.csr-asia.com/index.php?cat=7 CSR in Asia gaining traction Wednesday, October 6th, 2010 
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Four large Thai developers vary in their adoption of CSR. 
Italian-Thai Development Company and CH. Karnchang 
perform poorly, while Ratchaburi and the Electricity Gen-
erating Company do somewhat better. Both CH. Karnchang 
and Italian-Thai have somewhat vague CSR policies, Ratch-
aburi and EGCO policies are clearer. ITDC and CH. Karn-
chang have sections in their annual reports focusing on 
philanthropy and community development (Italian-Thai 
Development, 2011; CH. Karnchang, 2011). Ratchaburi and 
EGCO have comprehensive stand-alone CSR reports com-
parable to a GRI report (Ratchaburi, 2011; EGCO, 2009).
In China, it is unclear if China EXIM Bank has a CSR 
policy, although it has a small section on philanthropy in 
its annual report (Export Import Bank of China, 2011). 
China Development Bank has a CSR policy, stand-alone 
CSR report, and adheres to ISO 26000, a social responsibility 
standard (China Development Bank, 2011).
Among Chinese developers, Sinohydro has a CSR policy, 
produces GRI reports (GRI, 2012), and adheres to ISO 
14001, the environmental management systems standard 
(Sinohydro, n.d.). Both Datang and China Southern have 
CSR policies, produce GRI reports, and are members of the 
Global Compact (China Southern, 2011; Datang, 2009). 
Two Vietnamese banks, Vietcom Bank and the Bank for 
Investment and Development of Vietnam, were identified 
in addition to Electricity of Vietnam. No information for 
Vietcom or Electricity of Vietnam could be obtained as there 
was no English-language website. The Bank for Investment 
and Development has a CSR policy, but focuses on philan-
thropy (Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam, 
n.d.). 
Neither of the two Malaysian developers, Mega First Cor-
poration Berhad or Gamuda Berhad, have clear CSR policies 
or reports (Mega First Corporation Berhad, 2011; Gamuda 
Berhad, 2012). Electricité du Laos also has no information 
on CSR on its website (Electricité du Laos, n.d.). 
Conclusion: Engagement with CSR varies widely. Desir-
able elements of CSR in hydropower would include: 
• measuring and reporting publicly on impact;
• demonstrating benefits to the communities upstream and 
  downstream from the affected area;
• having environmental and social risk management systems 
  that are integrated into their corporate governance; and 
• reporting on which international environmental and human 
  rights standards they commit to follow.
Are there any examples of CSR in Mekong hydro-
power development?
Defining CSR in a hydropower context is difficult because 
many of the activities that would be treated as CSR by a 
manufacturing concern (building schools, clinics, clean 
water supply, etc.) are contractual obligations of hydro-
power operators. Whilst CSR has the potential to improve 
the overall quality of a project, it is not sufficient for sustain-
able development. CSR has not yet proved to be an effective 
substitute for third party oversight, strong regulations, and 
transparency within a country. 
The Theun-Hinboun and the Nam Theun 2 hydropower 
projects are frequently cited examples of ‘social responsibil-
ity’ in public-private partnership projects. Other public-
private hydropower projects, such as the Nam Ngum cascade 
and the Houay Ho dam, show no evidence of CSR. 
The Theun-Hinboun dam was the first major dam in Lao 
PDR to be developed under a public-private partnership 
(International Rivers, 2008), and one of the first build-own-
operate-transfer (BOOT) projects (Virtanen, 2006). The 
dam was completed in 1998 and is owned by the government 
of Lao PDR (GoL), Statkraft (Norway), and GMS Power 
(Thailand), who constitute the Theun-Hinboun Power Com-
pany (THPC). The ADB helped to fund the Lao equity stake 
(International Rivers, 2008).
The project was criticized for having inadequate public 
consultation and a poor environmental impact assessment, 
which resulted in adverse impacts upon the livelihoods and 
environment of 30,000 villagers living upstream and down-
stream of the dam. In particular, erosion of the Hai and 
Hinboun riverbanks has increased, leading to increased 
flooding, abandonment of wet season rice farming, destruc-
tion of riverbank gardens, and declines in fish catches and 
dry season drinking water sources (International Rivers, 
2008; Virtanen, 2006; Matsumoto, 2009). 
In 2000, THPC announced it would spend up to $4.5 million 
on a Mitigation and Compensation Program (International 
Rivers, 2008; Matsumoto, 2009). THPC had met its con-
tractual agreements with regard to the social and environ-
mental impacts. The company created a new social and 
environmental management division and took action to 
better compensate affected villagers, engage in community 
development, and invest in sustainable livelihood programs 
(Virtanen, 2006). Unfortunately the livelihood programs—
in particular dry season rice growing—have not been suc-
cessful due to poor quality land, insufficient water, and the 
high cost of inputs (International Rivers, 2008). 
Planning for the Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project (THXP) 
attempted to improve on past experience, and an EIA, en-
vironmental mitigation and management plan (EMMP), and 
resettlement action plan were drafted in accordance with 
ADB safeguards, the Equator Principles, and the 2005 
National Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainabil-
ity of the Hydropower Sector in Lao PDR (THPC, 2011). 
THPC’s report from its Social and Environmental Division 
on the progress of the THXP gives information on affected 
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villages and what it is doing in terms of: resettlement; its 
approach to downstream impacts; public consultation; 
livelihood development; public health; education; ethnic 
minorities and vulnerable groups; social impact manage-
ment; water quality, hydrological, erosion, fisheries, and 
construction monitoring; waste management; biomass 
clearance; and environmental conservation programs (THPC, 
2011). Matsumoto (2009), however, contends that the THXP 
has violated Lao PDR’s Decree on Compensation and Re-
settlement, the Equator Principles and IFC Performance 
Standards, and the terms of its own concession agreement 
and resettlement action plan. 
Nam Theun 2 (NT2) was also developed as a Build Own 
Operate Transfer (BOOT) project under a public-private 
partnership (Foran et al., 2010), and is owned by Electric-
ité de France, the Lao Holding State Enterprise, and EGCO 
(NTPC, n.d.). A total of 27 financial institutions funded the 
NT2 (Foran et al., 2010), including European and Thai 
export-credit agencies, MDBs, and private banks (Interna-
tional Rivers, 2008; Lawrence, 2009). In 2005, NT2 received 
funding from the World Bank, making it the first major dam 
to be funded by the bank in almost 10 years. The ADB and 
World Bank supported development of the NT2, as it was 
to follow best practice and set an example to encourage 
more sustainable hydropower development in the region 
(Lawrence, 2009; Molle et al., 2009). 
From the beginning, NGOs criticized the planning process 
for the NT2, saying that World Bank safeguards were being 
violated. They argued that consultations were inadequate 
or came too late, there was no options analysis, and the 
studies and livelihood programs had major weaknesses. 
During construction, NTPC failed to meet its commitments. 
Around 10,000 villagers were moved off their land before 
compensation was paid and resettlement villages were ready, 
information was not provided on a timely basis, and irriga-
tion systems were not set up. Independent monitors cited 
contractors for numerous environmental management infrac-
tions, including failure to control erosion and dust, and poor 
waste management and road building. NTPC has also had 
difficulty implementing its livelihood programs, as replace-
ment land is of poor quality, riverbank gardens have been 
flooded, fish stocks are expected to decline, and compensa-
tion money is insufficient. The micro-credit scheme adopt-
ed to disburse compensation money failed because it 
created a cycle of debt for villagers who were unsuccessful 
with their livelihood projects (Lawrence, 2009; Interna-
tional Rivers, 2008). 
International Rivers (2008) does say that the NT2 project 
has done better than many other hydropower projects in 
terms of having independent monitoring and publicly avail-
able reporting during project implementation. NTPC also 
has a range of environmental and social programs similar 
to THPC’s, including those on resettlement and livelihoods, 
compensation, public health, education, wildlife and forest 
protection, water quality monitoring, construction manage-
ment, and support for downstream communities (Dye, 2012). 
Molle et al. (2009) note that pressure from NGOs helped to 
improve the NT2’s environmental and social impact mitiga-
tion practices. 
Nam Ngum 2 is a public-private BOOT project. CH. Karn-
chang, Ratchaburi, Bangkok Expressway, and GoL are the 
key investors, while Thai commercial banks and the Thai 
EXIM Bank are the financiers. Neither an EIA nor a reset-
tlement action plan were publicly released and resettlement 
was conducted poorly. Villagers of different ethnicities were 
grouped into a single village and were not provided with 
adequate land. These issues were replicated with the Nam 
Ngum 3, another public-private BOOT project involving 
GMS Power, Ratchaburi, Marubeni Corporation (Japan), 
and the Government of Laos. Construction began before 
the completion of environmental and social impact assess-
ments, leaving great uncertainty as to the dam’s potential 
effects on fisheries and water quality. It was also unclear 
how livelihood restoration would be addressed. Sinohydro 
is the main investor in Nam Ngum 5, which has similarly 
been criticized for its incomplete environmental and social 
impact assessments and its poor livelihood restoration plan 
(International Rivers, 2008).
The Houay Ho was the first public-private BOOT project 
in Lao PDR, with Daewoo Engineering Corporation of 
Korea as the main investor. The project was not transparent 
and resulted in the resettlement of Heuny and Jrou ethnic 
minority groups without giving them adequate compensation 
or land. Only 20% of the allocated land turned out to be 
available, as the other 80% was already in use by other vil-
lages. In 2001, Daewoo sold its majority shareholding to 
Tractebel S.A., a Belgian multinational corporation. Condi-
tions in the resettled villages continued to deteriorate, and 
by 2006, 70% of the resettled villagers had moved out of 
the area. Tractebel claimed that it was not responsible for 
the resettlement mistakes made by Daewoo. Eventually, 
Tractebel made some effort to remedy resettlement problems, 
but only after being pressured by Belgian NGOs and having 
a complaint filed against them for disregarding the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (International 
Rivers, 2008). 
Conclusion: Even dam companies employing ‘best prac-
tices’, such as THPC and NTPC, have had difficulty provid-
ing information and timely compensation, sufficient 
productive agricultural land, and livelihoods. Income and 
food from declining fisheries, riverbank gardens, and agri-
cultural land has not been sustainably replaced. Meeting 
contractual obligations for social and environmental con-
cerns is hard enough and takes substantial human and 
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financial resources, as well as careful planning and the 
ability to adapt to unexpected challenges. Less socially 
responsible developers have failed to complete social and 
environmental impact assessments, and have resettled vil-
lagers without consideration for ethnic differences or restor-
ing lost livelihoods. Pressure from Western NGOs has forced 
some action to be taken by the developers of the NT2 and 
the Houay Ho, and many regional and local NGOs have 
been active in campaigning against developers.
What are the drivers of CSR in Mekong hydro-
power development?
Many of the traditional drivers of CSR do not exist in the 
Mekong. As previously noted, the main drivers of CSR are 
risk management and pressure from financiers, investors, 
customers, stakeholders, and the general public (LRQA and 
CSR Asia, 2010). Large hydropower projects are complex 
and involve multiple government ministries and agencies, 
as well as MDBs, public and private financiers, developers, 
and export-credit agencies from different countries (Haas, 
2008; Foran et al., 2010). A prime example is the Nam Theun 
2 dam in Laos that was financed by 27 institutions (Foran 
et al., 2010). 
Financiers of Mekong hydropower development are increas-
ingly Asian banks, particularly private banks. Few of these 
banks have adopted international frameworks such as the 
Equator Principles (Le Clerc, 2012; IFC, n.d.). Theoreti-
cally, it should be in the bank’s best interest to manage its 
exposure to risk through setting social and environmental 
standards. Banks want to avoid harm to their reputation, but 
because they are lenders—not equity investors—environ-
mental and social costs are less of a factor for them (Foran 
et al., 2010). 
The structure of electricity markets in Mekong River Basin 
(MRB) countries discourages pressure from customers. 
MRB countries have state-owned utility companies that 
have monopolies on electricity distribution, although Thai-
land and Vietnam are encouraging privatization of their 
electricity markets, and Cambodia and Lao PDR encourage 
private sector growth (Foran et al., 2010; Matthews, 2012; 
King et al., 2007). Market dominance by state-owned 
utilities means that there is little to no competition from 
independent power producers and distributors, giving cus-
tomers no choice, and thus no voice, in how their electric-
ity is generated (Foran et al., 2010; King et al., 2007). 
Because CSR is practiced mostly in publicly listed compa-
nies with concerned shareholders, the high number of SOEs 
in Mekong hydropower development reduces the strength 
of shareholders as a driver of CSR (LRQA and CSR Asia, 
2010; Krechowicz and Fernando, 2009b). 
Shareholder and public pressure in developed economies 
are known to be drivers of CSR, especially in the natural 
resource-intensive industries (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010; 
Krechowicz and Fernando, 2009b). In Lao PDR, however, 
where the bulk of hydropower development will take place 
(King et al., 2007; ICEM, 2010), civil society is weak (Mat-
thews, 2012). Thailand has the strongest civil society or-
ganizations, which have, on occasion, succeeded in 
preventing new dams from being built in Thailand. Civil 
society organizations in Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam 
have called for a moratorium on the building of mainstream 
dams (Matthews, 2012; Lawrence, 2009). Despite these 
concerns, Lao PDR has gone ahead with the construction 
of the Xayaburi on the Mekong mainstream (Bangkok Post, 
2012). 
Conclusion: Many of the traditional drivers of CSR are 
lacking in Mekong hydropower development. The complex 
structure of project finance and governance limits transpar-
ency and accountability, and motivation from individual 
actors to engage in CSR and risk management. It is unclear 
if Asian financiers are driving CSR practices. The dominance 
of state-owned utilities in electricity markets means that 
consumers have no influence and the dominance of SOEs 
makes shareholder activism a non-issue. 
What are the trends in CSR in Mekong hydro-
power development?
CSR in Asia continues to evolve but is still, to a large extent, 
characterized by a focus on philanthropy and community 
development, with little public reporting compared to the 
comprehensive reporting on environmental, social, and 
governance indicators that is more widespread in North 
America and Europe (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010; Krecho-
wicz and Fernando, 2009a; Krechowicz and Fernando, 
2009b). There is little transparency or participation in in-
ternational CSR initiatives (LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010), 
and a large number of non-publicly listed SOEs and family-
owned enterprises (Krechowicz and Fernando, 2009b). The 
main drivers of CSR in Asia are loose regulations promul-
gated on Chinese and Malaysian stock exchanges (LRQA 
and CSR Asia, 2010). 
A survey of the bigger organizations in Mekong hydro-
power development confirms these trends: only three out 
of the eight Thai banks and developers had CSR reports; 
four out of the five Chinese banks produced CSR reports; 
and the Vietnamese and Malaysian banks and developers 
had no CSR information available. 
Although THPC and NTPC are seen as ‘best practice’ dam 
operators, they still faced great difficulty in implementing 
resettlement plans, providing timely and sufficient compen-
sation, and restoring livelihoods. NTPC employed better 
practices because of conditions placed on its loans from the 
ADB and World Bank, in addition to the increased public 
scrutiny it faced, which is atypical for most dams in the 
MRB (Molle et al., 2009).
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The traditional drivers of CSR do not exist in the MRB, as 
there is no general pressure from financiers, customers, 
shareholders, or civil society. The transition to Asian finan-
ciers, monopolistic electricity markets, large number of 
SOEs and non-publicly listed companies, and weak civil 
society inhibit these traditional drivers of CSR. Furthermore, 
there are numerous barriers to CSR, including: corruption, 
poor governance, conflicts of interest in project develop-
ment, and the structure of power markets in the region (Foran 
et al., 2010; King et al., 2007; LRQA and CSR Asia, 2010; 
Krechowicz and Fernando, 2009b; Matthews, 2012; Haas, 
2008; Molle et al., 2009; Lawrence, 2009). 
Conclusion: CSR in Mekong hydropower development is 
limited. This is not likely to change unless factors in the 
enabling environment are altered in ways that encourage 
growth in the drivers of CSR. . 
What can we learn from other countries?
Two significant findings arise from studies of CSR in the 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and in 
Asia. First, country contexts have the greatest bearing on 
the extent of CSR in different countries (Chapple and Moon, 
2005; Alon et al., 2010; Abreu, Castro, Assis Soares and 
Silva Filho, 2012; Dobers and Halme, 2009; Robins, 2005). 
Confucianism in China fostered a society built on relation-
ships, hierarchy, flexibility, and negotiation. As a result, 
business in China is dominated by many family-owned or 
state-owned enterprises, and although China has a good 
legal foundation, laws are poorly enforced, in keeping with 
cultural preferences for the maintenance of relationships 
and negotiation. The strength of governance systems and 
the rule of law are important factors for the further evolution 
of CSR (Whelan, 2007). India and Brazil have higher levels 
of CSR adoption than China (Alon et al., 2010; Abreu et 
al., 2012), and law-based governance systems, as opposed 
to relations-based governance, are stronger in both countries. 
In addition, democratic political systems, as in Brazil and 
India, appear to encourage CSR, while some governments, 
as in China and Russia, discourage CSR (Alon et al., 2010). 
Democratic political systems tend to have stronger and 
better-enforced laws, and greater transparency and partici-
pation by civil society (Abreu et al., 2012). Culture and 
history have, however, also played a strong role in the growth 
of CSR in India, as many values associated with CSR are 
similarly rooted in the country’s religious beliefs and colo-
nial past (Chapple and Moon, 2005). This is shown by CSR 
in India being predominantly value-driven, and focused on 
using codes of ethics and improving the quality of life in 
communities (Alon et al., 2010). The type of CSR in India 
and Brazil, which is strategic rather than purely philan-
thropic, also contributes to the overall institutionalization 
of CSR (Chapple and Moon, 2005; Jamali, 2007).      
Second, Asian companies with international operations, 
even if these operations are still within Asia, exhibited 
higher levels of CSR adoption than companies with purely 
domestic operations (Chapple and Moon, 2005). The level 
of engagement with CSR will, however, depend on which 
country the company is operating in, as stakeholders in 
different countries have their own specific expectations and 
interests, and it is these stakeholder needs that the company 
is trying to address (Robins, 2005). This is perhaps why 
firms with international operations exhibit higher levels of 
CSR adoption—they tend to have many more stakeholders 
to manage (Chapple and Moon, 2005). 
CSR in developing countries is different from CSR in de-
veloped countries, and CSR is adapted further to individu-
al country contexts (Dobers and Halme, 2009; Robins, 2005). 
This does not necessarily mean that CSR is not relevant in 
Asia. Civil society, domestic consumers, and community 
pressure are drivers of increased CSR, and as the middle 
class grows, transparency increases, and public criticism 
mounts, companies may be forced to adopt CSR practices 
(Chapple and Moon, 2005; Epstein-Reeves, 2012). This 
was the case in Brazil (in conjunction with regulatory im-
provements) (Young, 2004; Abreu et al., 2012), and appears 
to be gradually occurring in China, as people demand better 
working conditions, cleaner air, and safer products (Epstein-
Reeves, 2012). 
Conclusion: CSR will be different in Asian countries, be-
cause it will evolve according to local historical, cultural, 
political, economic, social, and environmental character-
istics. CSR exists on a continuum. Certain characteristics, 
such as rule-based governance, democracy, transparency, 
and strong civil society encourage the growth of CSR. CSR 
varies between Asian countries, but companies with inter-
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What is the State of Knowledge (SOK) Series?
The SOK series sets out to evaluate the state of knowledge on subjects related to the impact, management and 
development of hydropower on the Mekong, including its tributaries. Publications in the series are issued by the CGIAR 
Challenge Program on Water and Food – Mekong Programme. The series papers draw on both regional and international 
experience. Papers seek to gauge what is known about a specific subject and where there are gaps in our knowledge 
and understanding. All SOK papers are reviewed by experts in the field. Each section in a SOK papers ends with a 
conclusion about the state of knowledge on that topic. This may reflect high levels of certainty, intermediate levels, or 
low certainty.
The SOK series is available for download from the CPWF Mekong website at http://mekong.waterandfood.org/
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Series 3. Vientiane, Lao PDR, Challenge Program on Water and Food.  
This SOK has been reviewed by Ame Trandem, International Rivers; Leena Wokeck, CSR Asia Center at AIT; 
Melody Kemp, independent consultant; Paul Angwin, People and Planet; and Pech Sokhem, Hatfield Consultants.
Reviewers cannot be held responsible for the contents of any SOK paper, which remains with the CPWF and associated 
partners identified in the document. 
This SOK has been edited by Terry Clayton at Red Plough International Co. Ltd. clayton@redplough.com and proofread 
by Clare Sandford claresandford@hotmail.co.uk 
Design and lay-out by Remy Rossi rossiremy@gmail.com and Watcharapol Isarangkul nong.isarangkul@gmail.com 
The Challenge Program on Water and Food was launched in 2002 as a reform initiative of the CGIAR, the Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research. CPWF aims to increase the resilience of social and ecological systems 
through better water management for food production (crops, fisheries and livestock). CPWF does this through an 
innovative research and development approach that brings together a broad range of scientists, development specialists, 
policy makers and communities to address the challenges of food security, poverty and water scarcity. CPWF is currently 
working in six river basins globally: Andes, Ganges, Limpopo, Mekong, Nile and Volta. More information can be found 
at www.waterandfood.org.
In the Mekong, the CPWF works to to reduce poverty and foster development by optimizing the use of water in reservoirs. 
If it is successful, reservoirs in the Mekong will be: (a) managed in ways that are fairer and more equitable to all water 
users; (b) managed and coordinated across cascades to optimize benefits for all; (c) planned and managed to account for 
environmental and social needs; (d) used for multiple purposes besides hydropower alone; (e) better governed and the 
benefits better shared. More information can be found at www.mekong.waterandfood.org.
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